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*Presidential Address*

CITIZENSHIP IN OUR TIME:  
COMMUNITY SERVICE, TOWN MEETING,  
PROTEST MARCH, OR DRAG SHOW?

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By formal definition, citizenship can refer to a category, tie, role or identity.<sup>1</sup> One theorist defines citizenship as “a collection of rights and obligations which give individuals a formal legal identity,” focusing on the combination of rights and responsibilities that make up the civic contract.<sup>2</sup> Citizenship is about membership, a set of shared values, and participation in the process of political life, which assumes some “knowledge and understanding of laws, documents, structures, and processes of governance.”<sup>3</sup>

But what does a citizen look like? How is citizenship properly enacted in these times? Citizenship is a category of membership — accordingly, we now ask more than ever, who exactly are the “us” and the “them” after 9/11/01? How are contemporary discourses of citizenship constructing and reconstructing our meanings of the terms of citizenship? To answer these questions I’ve explored the massive literature on citizenship, and collected a variety of contemporary images that represent citizenship in democratic societies. My research consisted of identifying and immersing myself in the various discourses of citizenship that are circulating in Western, English-speaking countries. These discourses, listed roughly in order of political dominance in our cultural moment, include: neoliberal, civic republican, political liberal, feminist, critical, cosmopolitan, transnational, and finally, queer. There has been an explosion in citizenship literature in the last several decades, and this literature has only grown in recent years. These discourses start with the Enlightenment, and move far, far away from its essentialized notions of humanity, citizen, and public sphere. But far from throwing away all Enlightenment notions of universal morality, some of the most “post” of these discourses rely on humanistic assumptions of the Enlightenment. To what extent do Enlightenment-born conceptions of citizenship burden us with dated understandings of political life, and to what extent do we owe debt to the Enlightenment understandings of human respect and dignity?

By way of response, I construct here a notion of citizenship that owes great debt to critical, feminist, and postmodern critiques of Enlightenment-based citizenship. I construct a citizenship that pushes on the boundaries of membership, employs notions of intersubjective agency, utilizes the unrecognized power of the aesthetic and performative dimensions of civic life, and reminds us of the importance of civil society as a significant context for the pursuit of democratic life. Finally, I will return to a legacy of the Enlightenment that this

era must still retain: an assimilative moral and political education based in a reconstructed universalist ideal that still seems necessary for more genuine democratic governments, and more peaceful global relations.

#### AGENCY: AN ESSENCE OF CITIZENSHIP

If we were to look for an “essence” of citizenship, to look for a commonality across various discourses of citizenship, the idea of agency might prove to be a most basic value. Many of the discourses emphasize knowledge, and various kinds of virtues are stressed, but these components of citizenship all point toward an active conclusion: that citizenship is something that happens when people are engaged in political activity for, with, on behalf of, or even against others. Democratic agency is an idea that is rooted in the Enlightenment infatuation with classic Greek philosophy and the Athenian city-state, and in the Enlightenment idea that citizens had certain rights and freedoms that no ruler could take away. In some conceptions of citizenship, agency is relatively limited, both in degree and in the approved spaces one can exercise it. The neoliberal discourse<sup>4</sup> seems to view agency as an economic power, as the power to buy things, to work for money, spend it, invest it or give it away. The civic republican discourse emphasizes the role of the citizen in traditional institutionalized processes like voting or communicating with one’s elected officials. The civic republican discourse also emphasizes community service as a way of both socializing the citizen into the common life of the society and making the society’s well-being a responsibility of all the individuals who inhabit it. Despite these more limited notions, however, agency remains a key notion of democratic citizenship.

Yet ideas of agency are moving beyond the Enlightenment, liberal domain. Drawing from feminist and critical discourses on citizenship, McAfee conceptualizes “complementary agency.”<sup>5</sup> McAfee argues that liberal autonomous notions of subjectivity assume one’s interests are set, reasons determined, and views self-understood. On the other hand, according to Kristeva, “a subject ... is an open system, always coming to speak and to be in relation with others, including the ‘other’ within.”<sup>6</sup> Using Kristeva’s notions of subjectivity, McAfee argues for intersubjectivity as a political model:

A theory of relational subjectivity suggests another model of group action, what we might call complementary agency. By this I mean people coming together in order to create new, broader understandings of what is in their interests. ... They help each other flesh out a more comprehensive picture of the whole.<sup>7</sup>

Intersubjective agency seems an essential notion to grasp for a critical citizenry. The powerful rhetoric of individual voice and choice that so dominates the Enlightenment ideals of citizenship must be challenged with notions of

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political subjectivity that are more complex, more mindful of not only our own multiple interests and identities, but of the ways in which the interests of “the other” intersect our own. Political subjectivity that focuses on intersubjectivity makes agency more powerful — it links my actions in political life with those of others, because it is with others that I understand and pursue my political interests and agendas.

Intersubjective notions of agency are a result of the feminist, multicultural, postmodern and poststructural critiques of civic republican and liberal citizenship. Whatever its conceptual victories, however, I am uncertain to what degree agency — in any form — is taught to our citizenry, either in school or in other educational institutions. Schools and mainstream media certainly tout voting and volunteering, but political agency beyond these limited forms of action is typically not stressed in institutions. Moreover, the hidden curriculum in schools often teaches the very opposite of political agency: docility, obedience, and submission to authority are among the important virtues that successful students enact in many schools. Obedience and submission do not necessarily bode well for political agency, intersubjective or otherwise. These qualities do bode well for democracy *for*, in the interests of, the state. But what if the state’s interests are not in *my* interests?

#### DEMOCRACY OF, WITH, AND AGAINST THE STATE

Agency is wasted if only enacted within the permitted confines of tainted political institutions. No matter what the corruption — Puritan moralizing that keeps out sexual minorities, American racism that favors white people and culture, or Western capitalism that drives out all agendas beyond profit — civic agency will be lost if citizenship is only conceived of as cooperative, sanctioned activity within the confines of institutionalized processes like voting or volunteering. Dryzek argues that states in capitalist economies are becoming less democratic to the extent that public policy becomes dictated by the need to compete and flourish in the transnational political economy.”<sup>8</sup> He suggests that

the democratic response . . . needs to be multidimensional and often unconventional. The prospects for democracy in capitalist times are better, however, in civil society than in the formal institutions of government, across rather than within national boundaries, and in realms of life not always recognized as political.<sup>9</sup>

Rather than looking at citizenship as the process of individual participation in “democratization of the state,” Dryzek and fellow critical democrats hope that democracy can be waged *against* the state, and *apart from* the state” through collective communications in diffuse, decentralized public spheres.<sup>10</sup> Working outside of, against, and on the state to generate healthy and productive conflict and controversy are significant elements within many of these newer citizenship

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discourses that challenge the Enlightenment ideals. Civil society is the arena apart from market and state — though of course not purely so — in which people can intersubjectively understand, enact, debate, and formulate their public agendas. Indeed, youth have their own kinds of civil society — societies of resistance and critique created in the spaces they psychically and physically inhabit beyond institutional walls. How can we help make these spaces richer, freer, more politically productive?

It is the rare classroom in America in which a teacher or a student is allowed to conceptualize democracy as something that is distinct from a vague idea of institutionalized governance. Civics classes are still focused predominantly on the three branches of government, the importance of voting, and of consensus-building activities with fellow citizens. Critical citizenship discourses enter schools, on those rare occasions when they do so, in forms that are better labeled “progressive,” than “critical.” While sharing the criticalists’ disdain for democracy-as-voting, and the emphasis on participation in public spheres as key factors in democratic life, progressive citizenship advocates typically lack the strong critique of American capitalism and its corrupting influence on state and nation. As Parker characterizes progressive civic education literature, agency and reasoning are central: “Emphasized is the development of ‘public agency— people’s capacities to act with effect and with public spirit’ (Boyte, 1994, p. 417) — along with rehabilitating citizens’ capacity for *phronesis* or practical reasoning.”<sup>11</sup> Just what “public reasoning” might consist of, however, is debated within critical discourses. Without claiming that we need less critical-rational debate, and without claiming that we need to teach students fewer rather than more skills to engage in this debate, I want to endorse another dimension of public agency — the performative — that is typically not discussed in mainstream citizenship discourses.

#### BEYOND CRITICAL-RATIONAL DEBATE

Agency is a concept not limited to the action of critical-rational debate. Tony Kushner (a playwright, not a philosopher) is the author of the most powerful words on citizenship that I have read in recent memory, a commencement address reprinted in a news magazine that I receive.<sup>12</sup> The address was funny and touching, critical and endearing, and it was inspiring. Kushner evoked the beauty of Emerson and his own considerable grace with words to move young hearts and minds to action for a more just world. As Cornel West and Maxine Greene tell us, the aesthetic realm can move us beyond the psychological pleasures of enjoyment and into the space of beautiful citizenship. Beautiful citizenship would understand this aesthetic component to civic life, which goes far beyond lovely green public spaces or inspiring national monuments. Dryzek acknowledges the importance of what some might call non-rational communicative acts such as rhetoric, gossip, humor, emotion, testimony and

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storytelling. He argues that deliberate democrats can be far more flexible in accommodating more forms of communication in public deliberation as long as such communications meet the criteria of being non-coercive, and of moving the listener from the particular to the general (storytelling, for example, must have a point beyond telling one's own story to be heard — it “must be capable of resonating with individuals who do not share that situation — but do share other characteristics.”)<sup>14</sup> Storytelling, rhetoric, humor and emotional testimonies all evoke the aesthetic domain, recognizing that our civic identities are embodied, often emotion-driven, and are subject to appeals beyond rational argument.

Warner and other queer theorists push this aesthetic, nonrational envelope farther. The public is not a continuum of critical opinion-making and debate, Warner asserts; it is far too inhibited and commercialized a sphere for that. It is an anonymous space of discourse “organized by nothing other than the discourse itself,” and is “as much notional as empirical.”<sup>15</sup> A public is better thought of as “poetic world making”:

Public discourse says not only “Let a public exist” but “Let it have this character, speak this way, see the world in this way.” It then goes in search of confirmation that such a public exists, with greater or lesser success — success being further attempts to cite, circulate, and realize the world understanding it articulates. Run it up a flagpole and see who salutes. Put on a show and see who shows up.<sup>16</sup>

Public discourse is the flag or the show, creating worlds that sometimes can put “at risk the concrete world. . . . This is its fruitful perversity.”<sup>17</sup> Enacting what Berlant calls “diva citizenship,” Anita Hill countered dominant constraints of family-values citizenship when she testified against Clarence Thomas to show that the workplace is a public space in which women's so-called private sexual and economic vulnerabilities are exposed.<sup>18</sup> Diva citizenship exists in acts of pedagogy, risk, controversy, and struggle in response to emergencies — threats to human dignity, like slavery, or sexual harassment — that are embodied, and first experienced as personal, intimate, and private. Diva citizenship exists in acts of public pedagogy about conditions of oppression or exclusion, acts which transgress the public/private divide and are historically embedded in systemic relations of power. Diva citizenship is political action in the sphere of counterpublics “in which it is hoped that the poesis of scene making will be transformative, not replicative merely.”<sup>19</sup> Warner, for example, discusses a circle of drag queens who came together in the mid-fifties through the mid-sixties in a New Jersey house they called Casa Susanna. The house was “a space of collective improvisation, transformative in a way that depends on its connection to several publics — including a dominant and alien mass public.”<sup>20</sup> In transgressing gender norms, these “ladies” were not only witnessing to each other in their display

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and play, but they were addressing the public in which their transgressions were stigmatized.

Imagine the Statue of Liberty. Now imagine the Statue of Liberty embodied by a man in drag, in shockingly garish eye-makeup and lipstick. Beautiful citizenship does not march to the beat of the traditional notions of gendered beauty, but it does call our imaginations, our minds and our bodies to play with active forms of political engagement. How might the aesthetic dimensions of life come to inform us as citizens and generate common goods, generate transformative ideas about how to live together? How might public enactments as poetic world-making be an inspiring metaphor for our young citizens, in an era in which “politics” is skeptically regarded? In many of our schools, in which free expression, creativity, and artistic play have always been seen as a developmental indulgence of the young, and to some degree a dangerous waste of time on the adolescent, an aesthetic, performed notion of citizenship is an unknown idea. This is in part because citizenship is typically an ascribed identity of membership rather than a performed enactment of political agency.

#### MEMBERSHIP: PUSHING BEYOND THE NATION-STATE

How inclusive, or how exclusive, is membership in a political entity like a nation-state? One of the most dominant discourses of citizenship, civic republicanism, resolutely maintains the benefits of “exclusivity”:

Citizenship is exclusive: it is not a person’s humanity that one is responding to, it is the fact that he or she is a fellow citizen, or a stranger. In choosing an identity for ourselves, we recognize both who our fellow citizens are, and those who are not members of our community, and thus who are potential enemies. Citizenship cuts across both religious and secular universalism and involves recognizing that one gives priority, when and where required, to one’s political community. It simply means that to remain a citizen one cannot always treat everyone as a human being. Again, this is a thought which lies at the heart of the civic-republican tradition.<sup>21</sup>

This logic has always been common-sense within our national rhetoric on citizenship: citizens are “us,” not “them.” The “us” category is inscribed through birth, or through immigration and naturalization. But we have recently seen the flaw in this kind of thinking, turned against us. In a certain sense, the terrorist was not treating everyone as a human being; the terrorist was treating some human beings (Americans) as non-human beings because he believed it was required for the benefit of his own political-religious community. The civic republican logic was turned against us, with a vengeance.

Feminist and queer theorist Shane Phelan has helpfully deconstructed the dichotomy of citizen/stranger. Using Bauman’s concept of the ‘stranger,’

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— “neither us nor clearly them, not friend and not enemy, but a figure of ambivalence who troubles the border between us and them” — Phelan urges us to embrace the stranger in others and ourselves.

Rather than flee from strangeness, sexual strangers may offer one another and others new ways of questioning the current tight fabric of citizenship and national identity. ... I hope ... to convince students of politics...that strategies of equality (crucial as they are) must always be attuned to the difference between equality and sameness. The position of the stranger is not only difficult, it is rewarding. Let us not abandon it for a citizenship that abandons others and suffocates that in each of us that does not fit; instead, I hope to help imagine and enact a postmodern citizenship of solidarity from the inside(r) out, in which many bodies, many passions, many families, many workers, find a place.<sup>22</sup>

Finding a place, Phelan insists, requires acknowledgment. “All citizens must be recognized not in spite of one’s unusual or minority characteristics, but with those characteristics understood as part of a valid possibility for the conduct of life.”<sup>23</sup> Phelan brings us to the opposite side of civic republicanism, a discourse in which the category of “stranger” is understood in some ways as a non-person or even as enemy. If the stranger is a person of ambiguity who is yet unknown, who lives outside the tight fabric of “normal” while inviting critical reflection on how that fabric is woven, then membership is less an exclusive club than an inclusive formality. The “us” category might expand, at least for moral purposes,<sup>24</sup> to all those who embrace democratic ideals, rather those who simply share our national identity as “American.”

The queer discourses of citizenship have rightly pushed on membership — sexual minorities have yet to be fully included in all aspects of citizenship in our society. Transnationalism is another emerging discourse of citizenship has also challenged our former thinking around membership. Joseph describes transnational citizenship as “nomadic, conditional citizenship related to histories of migrancy and the tenuous status of immigrants,” extending “beyond the coherence of national boundaries,” and “transnationally linked to informal networks of kinship, migrancy, and displacement.”<sup>25</sup> Joseph gives the examples of “feminisms, black nationalisms, labor movements, regional and subregional formations” that have staged their own citizenship outside the nation-state.<sup>26</sup> In this discourse, citizenship is staged and performed as opposed to given by birth or a decree from a state institution — the performance of identity here becomes a political enactment rather than a sphere of “rights and duties” conferred by a nation-state on an individual.

If citizenship is an enactment that is not contained by the boundaries of nation-state, if the civic sphere is a radically inclusive terrain, we seem to be

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back to an Enlightenment universalism.<sup>27</sup> A discourse of citizenship gaining some ground as of late is cosmopolitanism, a moral ideal based in Stoic, ancient Greek, and Kantian philosophies. Nussbaum, a key advocate of cosmopolitan citizenship, does not argue for a world government. But she does argue that cosmopolitanism has an empirical base: that ironically, globalization has transformed our world into a place whose successful navigation requires the wisdom of the ancient Greek and Enlightenment philosophers.<sup>28</sup> Enslin agrees, stating, “citizen education based on identity defined by membership of a ‘nation’ rests on the mistaken assumption that democracy is effectively pursued within the nation-state, whose influence and authority has been reduced by globalization.”<sup>29</sup>

Cosmopolitan and transnational civic education is by no means a significant presence on the public school radar, but its ideals have been at least been raised since 9/11/01.<sup>30</sup> “Should [students] be taught that they are, above all, citizens of the United States, or should they instead be taught that they are, above all, citizens of a world of human beings” who happen to be situated in the United States?<sup>31</sup> Nussbaum believes that our schools should be teaching students to learn to recognize and understand humanity “wherever they encounter it, undeterred by traits that are strange to them.”<sup>32</sup> Nussbaum’s cosmopolitanism requires three capacities to be cultivated among young people. First is the need for critical examination of oneself and one’s traditions; second is the ability to “see themselves not simply as citizens of some local region or group but also, and above all, as human beings bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern,” and third is the ability of narrative imagination, “the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself. . . to understand the emotions and wishes and desires that someone [else] might have.”<sup>33</sup>

Citizenship requires that we engage in moral judgment about how to treat both us and them. In a world like ours, with increasingly porous borders and technologically shortened-distances, the identities of “them” are as ambiguous as the “us” seems to be. The “them” belong to no nation — we bombed Afghanistan, but the terrorists who struck the World Trade Towers are not beholden to one government, one state. Similarly, the “us” is full of people who are connected with the “them,” people who worship the same God, who emigrated from the same lands, who share networks of kinship and history with those who would be our enemies.

To make discernments between “us” and “them,” and what obligations these designations carry, citizens need skills of moral judgment, and some basic normative standards. Oddly enough, citizenship in a “post-national” world cannot escape from this legacy of the Enlightenment. For many citizenship discourses, including those influenced by postmodern and poststructural theories, for whom

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the charge “assimilative” is a “fightin’ word,” there exists a normative notion about how people should treat one another. Callan makes this point in his critique of Iris Marion Young’s thesis against liberalism. Young, not unlike queer theorists Warner and Berlant, holds out city life — with its anonymity and freedom — as a civic ideal in which diverse citizens learn to live together “in a free play of difference.”<sup>34</sup> Such a civic ideal is superior to an assimilative liberal universalism, Young insists. Callan argues that even city life requires some moral judgment of its citizens, and it requires a political and moral ideal of tolerance, and open-mindedness about cultures other than one’s own. “Overcoming oppression demands a ‘revolution’ in the subject of political judgment because otherwise we confront difference with an amalgam of fear and loathing.”<sup>35</sup> Todd Gitlin concurs: “The Enlightenment’s enduring ideal of universal rights, once extended logically, guarantees the right to be different — although it is also a reminder that human beings have good reason not to differ about one elementary right: the right to be who one wishes to be.”<sup>36</sup> Young — and any other theorist offering a vision of citizenship, I would argue — does not offer a “non-judgmental pluralism” but requires “the resources of moral criticism that are necessary to the construction of any credible social ideal, liberal or otherwise.”<sup>37</sup> The resources of moral criticism gained by an ideology of human rights help us to point to the events of 9/11 as clearly evil, but such resources are also needed to help us to challenge our own evils within the nation-state: the oppressive cultural norms, the unfair political policies both at home and abroad, and the pervasive social inequalities. Citizenship education in schools must be at least weakly assimilative so that students might gain capability in such resources of moral criticism — resources on which citizenship discourses consciously or unconsciously depend.

What does citizenship in our “new” era require? While it depends on a notion of morality that moves beyond the traditional “us” and “them,” it retains notions of moral judgment that help us discern behavior, actions, and speech that are beneficial to, or aggressive towards, a democratic ideal of human equality and freedom. While it owes debt to an Enlightenment-inspired notion of human agency of man as political actor (rather than political victim), citizenship can move beyond individualistic subjectivity and action towards the relational and intersubjective. As citizenship is traditionally located within the confines of the state, newer circumstances demand an understanding of citizenship that looks beyond the state, and centers activity within and, perhaps more importantly, outside of, and against the state. Finally, democratic citizenship in this new era demands we face obligations of citizenship that go beyond nation-state borders. We are, potentially, democratic citizens in global movements. Our normative standards, as such citizens, help us to discern “us” and “them” based more on notions of human dignity and respect than on qualities of “Americanness” or loyalty to any one particular political identity.

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## NOTES

1. Charles Tilly, “Citizenship, identity and social history,” in *Citizenship, identity and social history*, ed. Charles Tilly (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 7.
  2. Bryan Turner, “Citizenship Studies: A General Theory.” *Citizenship Studies* 1(1) (1997): 5.
  3. Penny Enslin, “Education and Democracy Citizenship: In Defence of Cosmopolitanism,” in *Politics, Education and Citizenship*, eds. Mal Leicester, Celia Modgil and Sohan Modgil (New York: Falmer press, 2000), 149-150.
  4. For a chilling discussion of the ways in which meanings of democracy are increasingly tied to an ideology of the market, see Amy Stuart Wells, Julie Slayton, and Janelle Scott, “Defining Democracy in the Neoliberal Age: Charter School Reform and Educational Consumption,” *American Educational Research Journal*, 39(2) (Summer 2002): 337-361.
  5. Noëlle McAfee, *Habermas, Kristeva, and Citizenship* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 17.
  6. Ibid.
  7. Ibid., 134-135.
  8. John S. Dryzek, *Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideals, Limits and Struggles* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3.
  9. Ibid.
  10. Ibid, 36. Also see Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 47-56.
  11. Walter C. Parker, “‘Advanced’ Ideas about Democracy: Toward a Pluralist Conception of Citizen Education,” *Teachers College Record* 98, no. 1 (Fall 1996): 112. Parker provides an overview of the “traditional” citizenship education literature (largely grouped within the civic republican discourses), and the “progressive” citizenship education literature — both of which he finds to be assimilative in terms of racial, gender, and ethnic difference.
  12. “A Word to Graduates: Organize!” *The Nation* 275, no. 1 (July 1, 2002): 15-19. Kushner delivered the essay as a commencement address to Vassar College graduates in May 2002.
  13. Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, 62-74.
  14. Ibid., 69.
  15. Ibid., 67.
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16. Ibid., 114.
  17. Ibid., 113.
  18. Lauren Berlant, *The Queen of America goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship* (Durham: Duke University Press), 227.
  19. Michael Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics* (New York: Zone Books, 2002): 122. “Diva citizenship” is Berlant’s, not Warner’s construction, but both queer theorists emphasize the performative, theatrical nature of public texts, and so I join their ideas here.
  20. Warner, 13.
  21. Adrian Oldfield, “Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World,” *The Citizenship Debates: A Reader*, Gershon Shafir (ed.) (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1998), 81.
  22. Phelan, 4-5, 8.
  23. Ibid., 15-16.
  24. Citizenship rights — to welfare, to housing, to schooling — cannot be made all-inclusive absent a world government that would collect taxes and dispense such benefits absent national criteria.
  25. May Joseph, *Nomadic Identities: The Performance of Citizenship* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 2.
  26. Ibid, 9.
  27. For a discussion of the human rights movements and the ideology of “universal personhood” in the context of globalization, see Carlos Alberto Torres, “Globalization, Education, and Citizenship: Solidarity Versus Markets?” *American Educational Research Journal*, 39(2) (Summer 2002): 370-374.
  28. Nussbaum’s reliance on Kant’s universalism is described and critiqued in William E. Connolly, “Speed, Concentric Cultures, and Cosmopolitanism,” *Political Theory*, 28(5) (October 2000): 596-618.
  29. Enslin, 149.
  30. See, for example, the special issue of *Educational Leadership* (v. 60, no. 2, October 2002), “The World in the Classroom.” This issue contains a variety of articles describing global education, the teaching of world religions, and various curricula and programs that emphasize the importance of world geography, foreign language, art, and history in American classrooms.
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31. Martha Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," in *For Love of country: Debating the limits of patriotism*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 6.
  32. *Ibid.*, 9.
  33. Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997): 9-11. Marianna Papastephanou finds, in a critical reconstruction of Nussbaum's work on cosmopolitanism, that it begs many questions: is there a definable human nature at play in Nussbaum's work, and if so, what are the implications of that for cultural difference? Is the emphasis on narrative imagination in Nussbaum's work inviting Americans to "feel the pain" of non-American others to the extent that they might voice the others' needs for them? Is cosmopolitanism as a moral ideal based on a naïve political optimism that globalization does not seem to deserve as it is currently played out in politics today? See "Arrows Not Yet Fired: Cultivating Cosmopolitanism Through Education," *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 36(1) (2002): 69-86.
  34. Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990): 236-41, cited in Eamonn Callan, "The Politics of Difference and Common Education" in *Education, Knowledge, and Truth: Beyond the postmodern impasse*, David Carr, ed. (New York: Routledge, 1998), 148.
  35. Callan, 148.
  36. Todd Gitlin, *The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America is Wracked by Culture Wars* (New York: Henry Holt, 1995): 215; cited in Torres, 375.
  37. Callan, 150.
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