Effects and Implications of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 on Social Service Organizations

A thesis submitted to the University Honors Program at Miami University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for University Honors with Distinction

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April 2012
Oxford, OH
Abstract: This inquiry illustrates the effects of a piece of legislation, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, on social service organization providing welfare to low-income individuals in the United States. The theory is based on a model by Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) that links the inputs of stakeholders and resources to task design and, eventually, organizational effectiveness. When the legislation was enacted, the size of the stakeholder group was enlarged without the immediate provision of additional resources to the social service organization. As a result, the organizations reacted by altering three variables in their task design: client service provision, operational norms, and mission and scope.
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Many thanks to my advisor, Dr. Rodney Coates, who consistently reminded me to breathe at my low points and celebrate my victories during this process. Thanks also to my insightful readers: Dr. Walter Vanderbush, Dr. Randall Davis, and Mr. Juan Carlos Albarran. The Miami faculty has defined my undergraduate experience in the most positive ways, and I am very grateful.
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Introduction

The United States has often been colloquially referred to as ‘a nation of immigrants,’ referencing the piecemeal settlement of the country by refugees of economic troubles and social persecution. However, in the present day, much legislative effort is devoted to determining who the U.S. accepts legally into its fold, and the means by which immigrants may become naturalized citizens. This is an especially pressing concern for the American southwest region; the U.S., a decidedly first world nation economically, shares a border with Mexico, a former colonial power that has struggled economically through the 20th and into the 21st century. As a result of the stark differences in the two neighboring countries economies, immigration from Mexico to the U.S. has been deemed an issue of economic and national security.

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was a landmark piece of legislation, passed by the 99th Congress and ratified by President Ronald Reagan in the wake of mounting popular pressure for wide-scale immigration reform. This piece of legislation offered amnesty to undocumented immigrants who had been residing within the U.S., usually for purposes of agricultural labor, for significant periods of time. The legislation was crafted with the dual intention of normalizing the immigrants already living in the U.S. and stemming the influx of new illegal immigrants, however it was widely considered to be a failure.
Social services have traditionally been seen as a birthright of U.S. citizens, funded by taxpayer contributions. These social services act as a kind of safety net, allowing a cushion for those who play by the rules and pursue the economic American dream. Immigrant groups are often seen as taking advantage of governmentally funded social services without contributing adequate amounts to offset the expenses they incur to the system; undocumented immigrants are even less favorably viewed in this regard, as they rarely contribute to social welfare programs through the payment of income taxes. As a result, many ethnocentric individuals demonize immigrants as pariahs to social service provision.

A concrete effect of the 1986 immigration legislation was the addition of a large number of low-skill, low-income workers to the economy of the U.S. These newly legalized workers increasingly relied on social service organizations to subsidize low wages and substandard working conditions. However, the sudden increase in demand for welfare services proved strenuous for the organizations providing social services. The effects of the legislation on these agencies were multifaceted and nuanced, and affected the scope and quality of social programs offered for all Americans.

**Theory and Question Development**

In their 1999 article, “Galloping Elephants: Developing Elements of a Theory of Effective Government Organization,” Hal G. Rainey and Paula Steinbauer create a
systematic means for the analysis of effectiveness in governmental agencies. Below is the framework conceptualized in the form of a flowchart:

(Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999)

This inquiry focuses on the mediating effects of the provisions codified within the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, utilizing Rainey and Steinbauer's flow chart as a framework for the analysis of the provisions' effects on publicly funded social service organizations. By identifying the elements of the model upon which the legislation's provisions exert a direct or indirect influence, the pre-legislation and post-legislation operations of these organization can be theorized. Through research data and testimonials, the effects of the legislation on
the organizations can be surmised, and possible effects of amnesty provisions in
present day can be speculated. For the purposes of this inquiry, the analysis will be
limited to only a portion of the model, specifically the relationships between
‘External stakeholders,’ ‘RESOURCES,’ and ‘Task design’ (Rainey & Steinbauer,
1999).

Rainey and Steinbauer define external stakeholders as, “persons, groups, and
institutions that have an interest in the activities and outcomes of the organization
sufficient to draw their participation and attention to the agency” (Rainey &
Steinbauer, 1999, p. 14). It is not uncommon for agencies to have many distinct
groups of stakeholders, oftentimes with contradictory goals for the agency. In
effective agencies, the stakeholders are supportive, attentive, and provide clear and
beneficial directives to the agency, based on the perceived best interest for both
agency and individual stakeholder, and promote the overall effectiveness of the
organization (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999). Within the confines of this inquiry, the
stakeholders of social service agencies include: legislators creating and enacting
laws relevant to the agency and determining budgetary constraints for federally
funded social services; American citizens whose financial contributions through
taxes and private donations fund the social services provided; and clientele of social
service organizations.

Resources come in three forms: human, financial, and technological (Rainey
& Steinbauer, 1999). Human resources include labor forces for an agency, financial
resources are constituted in an agency’s budgetary constraints, and technological resources include an agency’s access to materials that promote the success of an agency’s goals in an efficient way. Resources are contributed to an agency by stakeholders and directly limit how an agency designs tasks to complete the goals set by its stakeholders and mission (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999). In this inquiry, human and financial resources are of paramount importance, due to their direct linkages to the outcomes of legislation; the amount and quality of services rendered to clients in a social service agency is directly correlated to the amount of resources available to the agency, and those resources are dictated by funding streams established by legislators.

Lastly, task design, as conceptualized by Rainey and Steinbauer, is the relationship between the work that individuals within an agency complete and the overall goals of the agency (both as perceived by workers within the agency and by stakeholders). With poor task design comes high turnover rates and, subsequently, poor organizational effectiveness (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999). According to the model, “The more the task design in the agency provides extrinsic and intrinsic rewards to individuals and groups, the more effective the agency” (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999, p. 21). When applied to social service agencies, the theory follows that stellar task design, created and implemented correctly, allows to equitable and efficient distribution of resources and provision of services to clientele.
It’s obvious to political science scholars that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 had profound social and demographic effects on the United States; as discussed later, the naturalization of several million new low-skill and low-wage citizens enlarged the potential client base for social service organizations as a whole. This inquiry intends to examine how this mandate from a key group of stakeholders (legislators), effectively increasing the numbers of another groups of stakeholders (clients) affected the relationships between stakeholders, resources, and task design, as outlined by Rainey and Steinbauer’s model. Ultimately, how were the operations of social service organizations effected by this sudden increase in potential client base?

**Immigration Climate in the Early 1980’s**

The early 1980s represented a time of stark increase in all forms of immigration to the U.S., however, ascertaining reliable statistical data to prove this statement has proved difficult, given the tendency for illegal immigrants to fly under the radar once within the country. According to data from the Migration Policy Institute, between 1981-1990, 7.3 million legal immigrants entered the United States (“MPI data hub,” 2000). In addition, a survey was conducted in 1979 by the Mexican government of households in Mexico, asking whether each household had family members currently looking for work in the United States. The survey deduced that approximately 400,000 Mexican workers were temporarily living in
the U.S., however, it is unclear, given the methodology of the survey and its failure to inquire into the legal status of the migrants, how many of these workers were undocumented (Passel, 1986). By comparison to many other published statistics, this is an extremely conservative estimate, and possibly a face-saving piece of propaganda for the Mexican government. Alternatively, the INS estimated that during this time there were 10 to 12 million undocumented immigrants living in the U.S., and that “the vast majority of these illegal residents residing in the United States, and illegally crossing the border were from Mexico” (Arp III, 1990).

The statistical increase in immigration from Mexico to the U.S. during this time period is varied in its multiple causes, with economic motivators at the forefront. Throughout the Third World, population growth vastly outstripped economic growth, resulting in widespread poverty and unemployment. In Mexico specifically, David Hiller predicted in 1983 that the population, “half of which is under the age of fifteen, will double in the next generation” (Hiller, 1983, p. 497). If we take into account that the average illegal immigrant during this time was considered to be a ‘young adult,’ this increase in population can be correlated with an increase in demand for the positions in the U.S. that were traditionally filled by undocumented workers (Passel, 1986).

The U.S. also has had a historic reputation of rhetoric of openness to immigrants, and across-the-board subsidization of public assistance programs that far out measured anything provided by Third World governments. Coupling this
with higher wages in the U.S. than in many Latin American countries produced a combination of factors, called ‘push’ and ‘pull factors,’ that motivated the increase in immigration. Subsequently, many critics of U.S. immigration policy point to the relative underfunding of border protection and immigration enforcement programs as being inefficient at deterring immigrants (Hiller, 1983).

In addition to the increase in both legal and illegal immigration of Latinos to the U.S. during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s as a result of economic factors, the U.S. also experienced an influx of refugees during this time. Most famously, in 1980, the Mariel Boatlift brought 125,000 Cuban refugees to Florida. Because of the highly public nature of this situation, the immigration situation in the U.S. was brought to the attention of the citizenry and their legislators; however, after the fervor surrounding the boatlift subsided, the interest in immigration reform as a crucial issue for the nation remained (Hiller, 1983).

Senator Alan K. Simpson, who would go on to introduce the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, summed up the basics of the immigration problem in brief, saying, “Population growth and economic stagnation in the Third World are increasing the pressures for emigration, and current United States immigration law is incapable of responding to the growing flow of illegal immigrants” (Simpson, 1983, p. 147). According to Simpson and other critics of early 1980’s immigration policy, a reform of the system was necessary. Moreover, immigration reform was a divisive issue in both political parties, and did not subscribe to party lines, showing
the pervasiveness of immigration-based economic concerns in the public consciousness (Citrin, 1997).

The concerns of the electorate directly informed the legislators’ concern on this issue. The public took up the public cry for reform of the system, pushing for comprehensive immigration reform as early as the late 1970s. “Two-thirds of respondents to a 1981 NBC survey and to a 1982 Roper poll said they wanted legal immigration levels reduced, a proportion twice as large as that detected in a 1965 Gallup survey” (Espenshade & Calhoun, 1993, p. 191). In contrast to previous eras, the late 1970s and early 1980s has been classified as a period of revival for neo-restrictionist attitudes of immigration reform, under which illegal aliens become scapegoats for a host of different economic frustrations (Harwood, 1986). In that vein, Americans had mixed-at-best attitudes to the violators of U.S. immigration law, although they believed that the system was flawed; in 1986 Edwin Harwood wrote in hindsight of the immigration reforms that had taken place, “Although some polls taken in the early 1980s showed considerable support for both the enforcement measures being proposed in new legislation and an amnesty for illegal aliens, recent polls indicate that the public is decidedly cool to the idea of granting amnesty” (Harwood, 1986, p. 206). Politically, for the Reagan administration, the time was right to begin reforming immigration laws, due to tandem interests of voters and legislators.
According to many accounts, the Reagan administration attacked the immigration problem reluctantly; wrote Nicholas Laham in his 2000 review of the administration’s immigration policy entitled *Ronald Reagan and the Politics of Immigration Reform*:

Reagan was disinterested in immigration and did not intend to devote his attention to this issue when he entered the White House. However, as a result of processes set in motion by his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, he soon found it impossible to ignore this issue. By the late 1970s, immigration had emerged as a top issue on the national agenda as a result of the unprecedented levels of immigration, both legal and illegal, which the Immigration Act of 1965 unleashed. (Preface)

The increase in both legal and illegal immigration to the U.S., especially from economically struggling Mexico piqued the interest and concern of many Americans in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This resulted in the scapegoating of illegal workers and a popular push for immigration reform measures; the average American believed that illegal workers were responsible for some of the U.S.’s economic ills, and were abusing systems of social services at the expense of the country. As a result, legislators set about determining the scope and nature of the problem (no easy feat considering the inherent and necessary coverture of illegal immigrants) and to develop legislation to cope with the undocumented workers in the country, as well as to stem the influx of new immigrants.
Social Services Under Reagan

Social service organizations (SSOs), including governmentally-based and non-profit welfare assistance programs, serve the crucial technical function of providing services, such as mental and physical well-being services, training and education, and cash and in-kind relief, to low income individuals in the United States. Simplistically, we can divide SSOs into the two categories of government SSOs and private non-profit SSOs, however, in practice, this distinction becomes muddled; through systems of grant-giving, the government can contribute money to non-profit entities, while private donors (who traditionally fund private organizations) may contribute money to government agencies. The situation becomes even less distinct when we consider the role of faith-based initiatives in social service. As a result, the public does not always hold distinct opinions of the different types of SSOs, and tend to lump all social service provision together. In general, "Nonprofit organizations invoke the images of community, voluntarism, civic dependability, and neighbor-helping-neighbor that have always exerted a powerful impression on American public consciousness" (Lipsky & Smith, 1989, p. 625). The American idealism of ‘the land of opportunity’ is based partially on the idea that the U.S. has a built-in support system to give deserving hard workers a running start towards prosperity.
However, the practical functions of SSOs are as multivarious as their funding streams. Human service organization scholar Yeheskel Hasenfeld’s book *Human Services as Complex Organizations* highlights as a fundamental principle of study the idea that the function of a SSO is determinant on the position of the individual analyzing it; for example, the perceived function of an SSO for an individual consuming services is different than the perceived function in the eyes of a donor, or the function according to an employee of the SSO (Hasenfeld, 2011). For the purpose of this inquiry, we will focus on three functions of SSOs with reference to immigrant populations: SSOs as providers of necessary services, SSOs as gatekeepers, and SSOs as political actors.

- **SSOs as service providers:** In the eyes of the public, the primary function of a SSO is the targeted allocation of goods and services to those persons deemed as ‘needy’ by some set of qualifications. According to Michael Lipsky, professor of political science at MIT, “Overall, the state recognizes 200 distinct types of social services in its purchase-of-service system” (Lipsky & Smith, 1989, p. 626). For example, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) oversees a repertoire of more than 300 programs that provide “a wide variety of tasks and services, including research, public health, food and drug safety, grants and other funding, health insurance, and many others” (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2011). These services are primarily need-based, with qualifications for provision being based on income, family size, and other factors relative to the socioeconomic
status of families or individuals. This is the traditional conceptualization of the functions of SSOs, with patrons and public alike expecting courtesy, efficiency, and accountability from the organization, especially in the cases where the SSO is receiving public monies.

- **SSOs as gatekeepers:** Kris Clarke of California State University in Fresno writes, “Human services workers are thus often thrust into the forefront of national integration efforts by having to act as gatekeepers to social and health interventions to increasingly diverse populations in homogenously constructed welfare states” (Clarke, 2009). Trends towards large-scale migration make the socially- and culturally- defined norms for who is considered an ‘insider’ versus an ‘outsider’ more complicated to negotiate. In the case of late 1970s and early 1980s America, we saw this complication met with increased hostility towards outsiders by those who consider themselves insiders, resulting in neo-restrictionist views on immigration policy. In the role of ‘gatekeepers,’ SSOs serve the function is legitimizing or delegitimizing a certain group of individuals, in this case migrant workers, as worthy or unworthy of receiving governmentally-funded social services.

- **SSOs as political actors:** Trends in social service provision have heavily skewed the use of public monies towards providing direct services to the poor rather than what is called ‘income transfers,’ or sums of money meant to subsidize low or nonexistent wages. According to Nicole P. Marwell of Columbia University, “More and more, the well-being of our poorest citizens
depends on state- and local-level decisions about how to allocate public
service contracts. These decisions greatly impact the street-level availability
of key supportive services like housing, job training, childcare, and so on”
(Marwell, 2004, p. 286). Under this system, it is imperative to the survival of
the SSO and subsequently to the provision of its services for the SSO to
become heavily invested in relevant political discourses. As a result, SSOs,
both private and public, have become actors and activists in social welfare
legislation policy. They have also become advocates for their clientele,
therein completing the circle of communication, and providing a voice to
legislators for groups, such as migrant workers, that would not have had
access on an individual basis.

During his administration, President Reagan instigated the ongoing policy of
putting SSOs, and nonprofit organizations specifically, in charge of addressing social
problems within the country (Lipsky & Smith, 1989). In keeping with the
conservative political track of the administration, the methods utilized with the
intent of bolstering social services were focused primarily on privately owned
entities, and were based upon conservative political theory. Admittedly, the
increased focus on non-governmental agencies has its usefulness; since this time
period, “government has used nonprofit agencies to expand the boundaries of the
welfare state in the United States in a host of service categories... The result is a
welfare state that is more expansive than would be the case if policy makers relied solely on the public sector” (Lipsky & Smith, 1989, p. 626). The Reagan administration’s conservative policies, therefore, instituted a series of budget and tax cuts, with the intent of making the field of SSOs a more competitive market. However, in retrospect, these policies seemed to hamper the charitable activities of SSOs overall (Palmer & Sawhill, 1982).

One lynchpin fear of nativist Americans was that influx of immigrants to the U.S. in the late 1970s and early 1980s would deplete social service resources for native-born Americans; under this assumption, social services operate within a zero-sum context where the allocation of resources to illegal immigrants would directly lessen the services available to legal immigrants and citizens. If we set aside the special cases of refugee migrants, however, it has been concluded that during the 1980s in general, immigrants utilized social services at distinctly lower rates than citizens born in the country. Of the social services available to native-born Americans, only a select few are even offered to those who cannot prove legal status; “The only public services that undocumented immigrants can receive, however, are emergency medical care, prenatal care, and k-12 education” (Perea, 1997, p. 142). For states along the border, where Mexican immigrants are most likely to settle, it was determined in 1987 that the rate of use of direct services, such as medical care and education, by undocumented immigrants far outstripped the rate of collection of welfare benefits or food stamps; this, ultimately, is beneficial to society. Additionally, the same study found that, in Texas specifically, the taxes paid
by undocumented workers and their families more than compensated the state for the social services that the group utilized (Weintraub, 1984).

**Characterization of Unauthorized Immigrants Prior to Immigration Reform**

A key problem in examining the severity of the problem of undocumented immigrants in an economy is the clandestine nature of the problem itself; it is exceedingly difficult to define the scope of a group that fears detection by the government in the first place. However, Jeffrey S. Passel and Karen A. Woodrow have, based upon a residual technique and U.S. Census Bureau data from the 1980 census, developed aggregate estimates of the population of undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. in the early 1980s. Overall, Passel and Woodrow estimate that 2.06 million unauthorized immigrants were living in the U.S. at the time of the 1980 census, with 1.13 million of those being of Mexican origin. Unsurprisingly, the American southwest had the highest concentration of these Mexican-born undocumented immigrants, with California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico all ranking in the 10 states with the highest Mexican-born undocumented immigrants (Passel & Woodrow, 1984).

The demographic profile of an average undocumented immigrant is similarly vague, due to the veil of secrecy under which individual unauthorized workers operate. In 1976, Davis S. North and Marion F. Houston conducted interviews and surveys with 793 apprehended illegal immigrants who had been living and working
in the United States for a minimum of two weeks. Through this methodology, we are able to paint an assumed demographic picture of the undocumented immigrant living and working in the U.S. in the decade prior to the significant immigration reform policies of the mid-1980s. Based on North and Houston’s interviews, we can assume that the average unauthorized worker is a 28 year-old male. About half of respondents were married, although 81% fiscally supported a family member on the salary they earned in the U.S. These workers also sent an average of $105 monthly in remittances to family still living in Mexico, and had been doing so for an average of 2.1 years’ time (North & Houston, 1976).

Accordingly, the primary motivation for individuals or families to migrate without authorization to the United States from Mexico during the late 1970’s and early-to-mid 1980’s was to obtain employment. North and Houston’s extensive survey found that 9 of 10 Mexican unauthorized immigrants surveyed reported employment as their main motivating factor, and “most illegals were unskilled or semi-skilled workers in their most recent U.S. job” (North & Houston, 1976, p. 4). Ironically, it is oftentimes the case that the net income of an undocumented worker decreases during his or her time working in the United States (Salinas & Torres, 1976). Overall, the average socioeconomic status for an illegal Mexican alien during this time period was poor, characterized by substandard wages, little access to healthcare or other benefits, or insurance (Salinas & Torres, 1976).
The daily social experience of the unauthorized Mexican immigrant during this time period was no less difficult than the socioeconomic experience; due to socially agreed-upon perceptions of illegal aliens in the workforce as detrimental to the economic well being of American citizens, Chicanos of all legal statuses faced (and oftentimes still do face) high levels of animosity and cultural stigmatization (Salinas & Torres, 1976). However, research conducted by Bean, Lowell, and Taylor at the University of Texas during the late 1980’s has concluded that the prejudices faced by unauthorized Mexican workers, and their subsequent characterization as detrimental to the U.S. economy is overstated and, in some cases, misguided; contrary to popular belief, their findings implied that “the effects of undocumented Mexican on the earnings of other groups may be small, and in some cases positive” (Bean, Lowell & Taylor, 1988, p. 46).

Due to the relatively low socioeconomic position of unauthorized workers in comparison to their legal status counterparts, undocumented immigrants residing in the United States, and especially in metropolitan areas, were highly likely to utilize public and social services; public services provided included “housing, education, safety, health care and employment,” though it is difficult to determine specific rates of usage amongst this group, due, again, to their necessarily secretive lifestyle tendencies (Passel & Woodrow, 1984, p. 643). However, undocumented immigrants did not necessarily conclusively utilize all public and social services with more frequency than did American citizens or visa holders; according to a 1985 paper published by Chavez, Cornelius, and Jones, Mexican immigrants of all legal
statuses were less likely than the majority racial group to utilize, for example, health care services. Moreover, undocumented Mexican immigrants were less likely still than their legal resident counterparts to utilize health care services, although when they did, they were more likely to go to an emergency room than a general practitioner (Chavez, Cornelius & Jones, 1985).

Not all camps definitively assert that unauthorized immigrants’ usage of public services represents a drain on society:

One of the major debates among immigration analysts is whether the money paid in taxes by undocumented aliens offsets the costs of services used by the aliens; in other words, do undocumented aliens cost society money or do they pay their own way? (Passel, 1986, p. 17)

Additionally, a paper published in the International Migration Review in 1984 entitled “Illegal Immigrants in Texas: Impact on Social Services and Related Considerations” and written by Sidney Weintraub, of the University of Texas at Austin, concluded the following:

A survey conducted of undocumented aliens and providers of public services showed that the state of Texas receives more from taxes paid by undocumented persons than the cost of the state to provide them with public services, such as education, health care, corrections, and welfare. The same survey showed that six cities in the state (Austin, Dallas, El Paso, Houston,
McAllen and San Antonio) together expended more to provide services to undocumented aliens than they received in taxes (1984, Abstract).

However, even academically motivated accounts differ on whether or not the taxes paid by undocumented immigrants were sufficient to cover their portion of the drain on the social services structure in all, or even a majority of, cases. With reference to the late 1970’s and early-to-mid 1980’s time period specifically, we may never know; being temporally removed from that time period, and separated by several generations of immigration reform legislature, any study conducted with modern data cannot necessarily be generalized to that era.

**Ratification of IRCA**

Public Law 99-603, known colloquially by its short title as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), was passed by the 99th Congress of the United States on November 6th, 1986 ("Pub. l-99-603 immigration," 1986). The law is intended to enact a higher degree of governmental control over unauthorized immigration into the United States, especially with reference to unauthorized labor flows across the Mexico-U.S. border (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2006). In its implementation, IRCA legalized 3.2 million undocumented immigrants, with Mexican-born immigrants making up ¾ of that figure (Durand, 2001). As previously discussed, the national immigration situation was grave enough to warrant bi-partisan support for a reformation of the Immigration and Nationality Act; Sen. Alan
K. Simpson (R-WY) who introduced S.1200 which ultimately became IRCA had, two years prior, introduced a similar bill: S.529. This bill garnered strong support from Democrats in both chambers. Although IRCA was not seen as the final chapter for immigration reform, the legislation was viewed as a pivotal stepping-stone in revision of a broken system; in a 1987 publication of the San Diego Law Review, Congressman and former Attorney General of California, Daniel E. Lundgren wrote:

Yet, whatever future changes [to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986] may be needed, it is clear that congressional and Administration support for passage of this immigration reform legislation in the 99th Congress reflects a heightened sense of urgency to address the current problems of illegal immigration in this country – problems which continue to grow each day" (1987, p. 302).

In its ratified form, IRCA is comprised of seven titled provisions that serve to reform the immigration standard in an attempt to decrease the number of undocumented workers in the United States labor market (United States Congress, 1986). Especially pertinent to this inquiry are the following provisions:

- **Title I: Control of Illegal Immigration**: This two-fold provision addresses prevention of unauthorized immigration through a system of employer sanctions for the employment of undocumented workers, and improvement of (including increases in funding for) federally-based immigration control
and enforcement programs, including Border Patrol and Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS). This provision renders it explicitly illegal to employ workers, including those hired through subcontracting services, that cannot provide documentation of citizenship, naturalization or, alternatively, authorization to work legally within the U.S. It also revises criminal penalties for the unlawful transportation of unauthorized immigrants into the U.S, and creates a $35,000,000 emergency immigration fund for purposes of border enforcement activities and State and local reimbursement for immigration control practices (United States Congress, 1986). Although many speculated during the bill’s markup and consideration that this section of the final legislation would include a provision establishing a national identity card or system, the law’s text expressly states that it does not authorize such a card or system (United States Congress, 1986).

- **Title II: Legalization:** Arguably the most groundbreaking provision of IRCA, Title II created a program by which undocumented residents in the United States could naturalize, provided that the persons could prove residence within the country for a duration of at least four years. An 18-month window for application for temporary residency status was opened upon the passage of IRCA. Subsequently, those approved for temporary residency status could, within a year, apply for permanent residency, barring those residents with felony convictions or those involved in acts of persecution. In order to receive citizenship in this manner, those aliens under the age of sixty-five
were also required to pass a citizenship test. This provision also limited the federal welfare programs to which the newly certified residents were entitled; for a five-year period after being granted temporary residency, and a subsequent five-year period after being granted permanent residency, naturalized aliens were prohibited from receiving Federal financial aid, Medicaid, or food stamps (with the exception of the aged, disabled, or blind) (United States Congress, 1986).

• *Title III: Reform of Legal Immigration:* In addition to myriad technical provisions directed to the reformation of temporary and seasonal agriculture worker visas and promoting the hiring of domestic seasonal employees, Title III extended permanent resident status in the same manner as Title I to seasonal agricultural workers who could prove that they had a minimum of 90 man-days of labor within the previous year. Title III also increased the number of visas available to qualified immigrants from 600 to 5,000.

**Goals of the Legislation**

Although the citizenry and legislators of the U.S. were definitively in bipartisan agreement during the 1980’s when it came to the consequences of an ineffective immigration system, crafting a plan for reform proved to be inherently complicated. Unauthorized immigration does not have one clear-cut and definitive motivator, and therefore is difficult to legislate against. However, according to
President Reagan’s statement upon signing of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the administration recognized the complexity of the problem at hand, and developed a sufficiently detailed and systematic approach to stemming the influx of undocumented labor; said The President in his signing statement, “In 1981, this administration asked the Congress to pass a comprehensive legislative package, including employer sanctions, other measures to increase enforcement of the immigration laws, and legalization. The act provides these three essential components” (Editors, 2011).

The overarching goal of the reform of the Immigration and Nationality Act was a basic one: to reduce the number of unauthorized aliens coming into the United States to live and work. However, after five years of legislative meandering, it became necessary for the 99th Congress to pass measures that, if not adequately complex, were at least definitive in their efforts to stem the flow of undocumented aliens (White, Bean & Espenshade, 1990). Thusly, IRCA provides a three-pronged outline for combating unauthorized immigration: establish employer sanctions (provided for in Title I), reform and enforcement of immigration laws already in place (also provided for in Title I, as well as in Title III), and a program of amnesty and legalization (provided for in Title II).

The multifaceted character of the legislation was utilitarian in its construction. As previously discussed, both legal and illegal immigration are encouraged by sets of ‘push factors’ and ‘pull factors’ that motivate individuals to
uproot their lives and migrate. Push factors are those motivators in the immigrants’
home countries that would motivate persons to leave; examples of push factors for
Mexican nationals include gang-based violence and unstable economic conditions in
their home country. On the other hand, pull factors are those positive qualities that
attract immigrants to a certain country; in this case, the United States’ pull factors
include an abundance of low-skilled labor jobs and a reputation for being a land of
opportunity.

At least one aspect of the three-pronged approach that the Reagan
administration appealed to Congress for directly combats some pull factors of the
U.S.’s economy. If we accept the foregone conclusion that the presence of
undocumented workers in the U.S. has a negative impact on the economy as a whole,
it therefore becomes necessary to legislate against undocumented workers’
participation in the economy (Kaplan, 1992, p. 547). The two parties responsible for
this group’s participation in the economy are the workers themselves, and the
employers that hire them. Therefore, the logic follows that the key to dissuading
undocumented alien participation in the economy is to make the job market less
appealing to unauthorized immigrants, and to make the hiring of these
undocumented workers less appealing to employers. By instituting employer
sanctions, IRCA seeks to accomplish both of those goals; the legislation increases the
costs to employers of hiring undocumented laborers, therefore dissuading the hiring
of undocumented labor, while simultaneously rendering jobs scarcer for those
without work authorization.
The provision for legalization in IRCA also seeks to discourage additional unauthorized immigration in that it normalizes a sector of the labor market that previously would have been counter-normative. This discourages additional immigration by creating an employer bias towards newly naturalized immigrants already living in the United States for domestic positions that are most attractive to unauthorized migrants. Lastly, the increased emphasis on immigration enforcement provides a logistical leg to the plan, making it marginally more difficult for immigrants to enter the job market without proper documentation.

**Results of IRCA Implementation**

The amnesty provision in IRCA was widely utilized amongst undocumented immigrants, with 3 million people applying for legalization (Rytina, 2002). Of the applicants, 2.7 million illegal residents (including 2 million of Mexican origin) were granted legal permanent resident (LPR) status under the legislation (Orrenius & Zavodny, 2003). By 2001, 1/3 of those Mexican immigrants granted LPR status had become full legal citizens, through the naturalization process, resulting in nearly 1 million new U.S. citizens as a direct result of IRCA. Comparatively, non-Mexican immigrants during this time period naturalized at a rate of 56%, speaking, perhaps, to the transitory and temporary nature of Mexican workers’ motivations for being in the U.S.:
(Rytina, 2002)

There is some evidence that in the short-term, the implementation of IRCA did cause a decline in border crossing rates, due to the provisional increase of border security measures (The Urban Institute, 2001). However, according to data and estimates from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and The Urban Institute, IRCA’s implementation did not result in long-term stemming of immigration; in fact, quite the opposite effect has been recorded, with an increase of anywhere between 1 and 4 million more immigrants entering the U.S. in the 1990s than entered in the 1980s, as evidenced by the table below:
Current Levels are High, but Uncertain

Figure 1. Immigration by Decade, 1821-1830 to 1991-2000

Source: INS data and Urban Institute estimates.

(The Urban Institute, 2001)

One possible explanation of the ineffectiveness of IRCA’s measures in significantly decreasing immigration is the perception by some migration scholars of a weak correlation between the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors targeted, and border crossing rates. The legislation specifically sought to neutralize these factors, through economic disincentives for employers, as well as increased security to dissuade new illegal immigrants. However, if the legislation targeted the wrong factors, the implementation of the legislation would produce a smaller than expected decrease in immigration, as was observed in actuality.
The IRCA legislation was partially targeted towards affecting the relationship between employers of low-skill labor forces and the immigrants who assumed those low-skill positions; the legislation was crafted to normalize a covert labor force of undocumented workers that were routinely being exploited by their employers through illegal business practices, including sub-standard wages. As a result of the employer sanctions provision (Title I), employers were incentivized against hiring undocumented workers, and conversely encouraged to employ workers of legal status. Title II of IRCA also increased the number of legally documented workers in the U.S. by over 2 million people. This undoubtedly had a poignant effect on the economics of the labor market in the U.S., specifically on wages for immigrants and the labor market available to employers.

As a result of IRCA, it has been theorized that wages and working conditions for those immigrants who remained undocumented or immigrated illegally after the IRCA period were worsened, as a result of discrimination on the part of employers (Phillips & Massey, 1999). LPRs and naturalized citizens through IRCA fared slightly better than their undocumented counterparts, but still saw a decrease in their wages, relative to native-born citizens, in the 1980’s and 1990’s. As evidenced by the graph below, Hispanic workers, especially those who were male, saw a slight but steady trend of decreasing wages between 1986 and 1995:
Mean Weekly Wages of Women and Men Working Full-Time, Full-Year with No More than a High School Education


(Employment and work-related risk factors)

This is not to say that the wages of immigrants during the 1970's were comparable with those of native-born Americans; as demonstrated by the above graph, non-Hispanic white and black Americans enjoyed significantly higher wages than their Hispanic counterparts. “The combination of relatively low skills and sluggish wage growth suggested that the immigrants who arrived in the 1970s would not attain wage parity with U.S.-born workers during their working lives” (Borjas, 1994). The trend for wage differentials between immigrants and native-born Americans from the 1970’s to the 1990’s was negative, with immigrants in each subsequent decade earning 18.1%, 32.3%, and 38.2% less than natives, respectively (Borjas, 1994). Economic literature on wage trends in immigrant host countries, however, disputes that the downward trend in wages for immigrant is directly correlated with an increase in immigrant populations. According to Rachel
M. Friedberg and Jennifer Hunt, "Most empirical analysis of the United States and other countries finds that a 10 percent increase in the fraction of immigrants in the population reduces native wages by at most 1%" (Friedberg & Hunt, p. 42).

Given the nativist and anti-immigrant sentiments of the era, coupled with the implementation of employer sanctions, it has been determined that the decrease in relative wages for Mexicans may be related to employer prejudice against hiring Mexican-born workers, for fear that the workers were undocumented. One study even found significant statistical differences between the wages of Mexicans and those of Puerto Ricans and Cubans during the post-IRCA period, and attributes the differences to employer prejudices (Bansack, 2005).

The characteristics of the individuals within and labor market itself were affected as a result of IRCA’s implementation. Legalization of worker status through LPR status and eventual naturalization created a larger legal worker pool for hiring purposes. Because of the concentration of Mexican workers in southern border states, the addition of such a large number of newly documented laborers was especially profound, and, “Employers seeking relatively inexpensive documented immigrant labor were confronted with an abundance of such workers” (Sorensen & Bean, 1994). Additionally, amnesty resulted in workers acquiring additional skills and English language proficiencies. As a result of these two factors, “The effect of human capital fell, as schooling became irrelevant, and the overall effect of English language ability was halved” (Phillips & Massey, 1999, p. 244). The decline in the
importance of skills and language proficiency was correlated with an increase in the importance of social capital within immigrant communities (Phillips & Massey, 1999).

Overall, the implementation of IRCA did not drastically improve the economic conditions of Mexican immigrants within the U.S. In fact, the legislation’s provisions may actually have slightly deteriorated wages for immigrants, institutionalized prejudices in hiring practices, and rendered less important the acquisition of certain skills that were valued in the pre-IRCA economy for low-skilled labor.

**Social Reactions to IRCA**

Because so much of the push for immigration reform was fueled by the popular pressures of native-born Americans, especially those with nativist, or anti-immigrant positions, and because federally-funded social service programs and grants utilize public monies, it is important to this inquiry to discuss the reactions of different social groups within the U.S. to the passage and implementation of IRCA in its ratified form. As with any contentious piece of legislation, short-term reactions to the passage of IRCA varied across different socioeconomic and political subgroups, with the most pertinent to this inquiry being: domestic (or native-born), immigrant, and employers.

- *Domestic and native-born reactions:*
Initial reactions to IRCA’s passage were benign, for the most part.

Senator Simpson, who sponsored the bill said of the public’s reaction to the passage process, “We used the word 'legalization... And everybody fell asleep lightly for a while, and we were able to do legalization” (NPR Staff, 2010). However, it is impossible to generalize one opinion on the IRCA legislation for all native-born Americans. One of the loudest factions voicing opinions on the reforms in the time periods both before and after the legislation was implemented were those expressing nativist or anti-immigrant sentiments. Prior to the immigration reform measures’ passage, this group represented a large portion of those in favor of reforming the system, especially with the intent of decreasing both illegal and legal immigration specifically. In the wake of IRCA’s implementation, nativists expressed similar sentiments. According to a Gallup Poll conducted in 1995, 2/3 of respondents believed that immigration should be reduced at the national level. This number was similar to responses gathered in 1980 and 1981, indicating that the opinions of domestic groups towards immigrants remained largely unchanged as a result of IRCA’s implementation (Espenshade & Belanger, 1997). As previously discussed, many of the critics of the implemented legislation were concerned with the possible economic fallout associated with legalization of such a large number of low-skill, and therefore low-income, workers. Ironically, these concerns were similar in tone to those voiced by pro-reform activists prior to the
legislation, indicating that IRCA did little to quell the fears of those nativists who inherently mistrusted the intentions of immigrants.

- **Immigrant reactions:**

  Immigrant groups voiced two major criticisms with the legislation, as it progressed from its inception through its implementation stages. First, there was, in many immigrants’ and pro-immigrant groups, a systematic failure on the part of legislators to include Latino voices in the planning and writing of the bill. With the recurring problem of covertness of the population being, again, salient, concurrent with a lack of formal structure within the population, it would have been difficult for legislators to consult with undocumented immigrants directly. However, the legislators could have consulted with Latino-based or –serving organizations to obtain perspectives, and yet failed to do so. This was unsurprising to most in the field; “A lack of resources—membership, organization structure, finance and political expertise—prevents powerless groups effective entry into the defining mechanism called agenda setting” (Arp III, 1990, p. 336). As a result of this exclusion, an opportunity was lost for immigrant populations to directly influence the legislation that would so drastically affect their lives in the U.S.

  The second criticism of immigrant groups focuses on the implementation of the amnesty provision of IRCA. The guidelines for eligibility for LPR status and the path to citizenship were considered too restrictive. The
unanimous opinion of all Hispanic organizations surveyed in one 1990 study was that the large registration fees, requisite documentation, lapse in communication re: implementation practices, and lack of provisions for family unification set the bar too high for many of the undocumented immigrants in the country (Arp III, 1990). As a result, “it is assumed that many undocumented aliens did not participate in the amnesty program” (Gelfand & Bialik-Gilad, 1989, p. 24).

- **Employer reactions:**

  In retrospect, perhaps the most pervasive criticism of IRCA is the restrictions that the legislation placed on employers’ hiring practices; Title I imposes sanctions upon non-compliant employers who utilize undocumented labor. The provision requires employers to verify workers’ employment eligibility by securing documentation of legal status prior to hiring, and was intended to disincentivize the knowing hire of undocumented workers. Hindsight analysis, however, asserts that many employers effectively became ‘gun shy’ in the wake of IRCA’s implementation, becoming more reluctant to hire any Latino workers, regardless of legal status, in fear of the sanctions (Welin, 1989). What resulted was systematic discrimination of Latino workers in sectors in which that group had, prior to IRCA, enjoyed high employment rates. IRCA makes this kind of national origin discrimination a federally punishable offense (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
Employers may not have been wholly at fault in this situation, though, according to some scholars; “First, it may be possible that employers were unsure or unclear as to the law’s major provisions. Second, the law's verification system does not provide a simple or reliable method to verify job applicant eligibility” (Bansack, 2005, p. 1282).

On the other end of the spectrum, there also existed a significant number of employers that continued to violate the Title I provisions of IRCA, even with the threat of sanctions standing (Calavita, 1990). Under the provisions, an employer must first be reported for alleged employment discrimination before INS would investigate the hiring practices of the firm, and, incentives. “Unfortunately, despite evidence of employment discrimination related to IRCA, few individuals have filed complaints against employers” (Welin, 1989, p. 260). For these employers, IRCA proved to be a boon, providing more options for labor while ineffective enforcement of Title I provisions maintained hiring of undocumented workers as a low-risk alternative (Calavita, 1990).

Post-IRCA SSOs & the Analytical Model

As previously addressed, the provisions within the IRCA legislation that provided temporary resident status with the potential of naturalization led to 2.7 million new legal permanent residents of the U.S. within a very short time span.
These newly legalized workers were primarily low-skill and therefore garnered low wages. Formerly barred by their lack of legal status from access to many economic welfare programs, these low-income workers suddenly found themselves formally participating in the social welfare system; although it has been established in retrospect that, through taxes and other means, undocumented immigrants recompensed the system for the limited welfare programs that they utilized, their new formalized economic standing expanded both their contributions to the welfare system and their utilization of services. As a result, SSOs were directly affected by the provisions of the IRCA legislation, and were forced to react accordingly.

Utilizing the conceptualization of effective government agencies developed by Rainey and Steinbauer in “Galloping Elephants,” it is possible to compartmentalize the affecting variables set in motion by the passage and implementation of IRCA and determine the effects they had on the parts of the model relevant to this inquiry: external stakeholders, resources, and task design. Ultimately, these effects lend legitimacy to an evaluation of the effectiveness of social service organizations before and after the implementation of IRCA.

Most basically, the addition of 2.7 low-income taxpayers to the legal system widened one base of external stakeholders considerably. Legal permanent residents are, in the U.S., afforded more access to social and economic welfare programs than undocumented immigrants are able to utilize; immediately after the enactment of IRCA, LPRs and naturalized citizens under the legislation were legally able to access
social service resources including, but not limited to, Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Social Services Block Grants, Social Security benefits, food stamps, and other forms of federal assistance based upon income level. For a few of these programs, a tenure of approximately 5 years of LPR status was required before the services would be provided; this created the unique situation of a dual wave of increases in demands for service, with one wave occurring immediately after amnesty provisions were passed in 1986, and a second wave occurring in the early 1990s (Horn, 2006). These allowances persisted until August 22, 1996, when Congress enacted the Welfare Reform Act, wherein these forms of social assistance were once again denied to able-bodies permanent legal residents; the constitutionality of denying these forms of assistance to LPRs and legal immigrants was been challenged, but the legislation resulted in a 54% decrease in the caseload of SSOs (Clinton, 2006). However, between January 1988 and January 1993, the number of TANF recipients nationally jumped dramatically, from 10.4 million to 14.1 million, respectively (Bryn Mawr College, 2000). It is important to note that the number of cases, while trending towards increase beginning almost immediately after the passage of IRCA, spike suddenly around FY 1991.
National Welfare Caseload (Average Monthly Recipients), 1936-1999

Source: (Bryn Mawr College, 2000)

Additionally, the number of Hispanic families receiving welfare benefits trended upwards from 1985 to 1995 (Lower-Basch, 2000). It can be concluded, therefore, that the marked increase in the number of low-income LPRs and naturalized citizens created through the amnesty provisions in IRCA can be correlated with an increase in caseloads for social service and welfare providing organizations. With a widening of the clientele stakeholder base, came an increased demand for services, and, ultimately, an increased provision of service by SSOs.
Federal funding for SSOs in the wake of IRCA can be divided into two dichotomous eras: funding during the remainder of the Reagan presidency (1986-1989), and during the Bush I and Clinton years, up until the passage of the Welfare Reform Act (1990-1996). The broadening of the clientele base of SSOs was not matched with an increase in funding for the organizations during the remainder of Reagan's term. As previously discussed, Reagan's presidency was characterized by an approach to SSO funding that emphasized the effects of competition on driving down the costs of social service provision through the free market system. The result of these policies can be observed on the following graph:

(Rector, 2010)
After the conclusion of Reagan's term, until the 1996 passage of the Welfare Reform Act, spending on welfare programs, which had remained relatively stable since the passage of IRCA, skyrocketed. As a percentage of GDP, spending on Health and Human Services in the U.S. went from being below 3% every recorded year before 1990 to over 4% in 1996, and has not descended below 3.9% since (Rector, 2010). Coincidentally, the increase in funding was simultaneous with the second wave of increase in service demand as some LPRs became eligible for naturalization, and eligibility requirements for certain services based on tenure were met in the early 1990s.

These funding trends represent the 'resources' aspect of the Rainey and Steinbauer model. The first phase of funding (non-increase during the Reagan term) can be figured as a constant input of resources, coupled with an increase in relevant stakeholders. The second phase of funding (rapid increase after Reagan's term) can be figured as an input of additional resources to compensate for the prior increase in relevant stakeholder base.

What do these effects of IRCA translate into for social service organizations, based upon the Rainey and Steinbauer model? Based upon the linkages illustrated in the model, changing the inputs of stakeholders and resources will theoretically have an effect on the task design of service provision enacted by the SSOs. The changes observed in the case of the wake of IRCA implementation can be characterized under three overarching banners:
• Changes to client service provision by SSOs: There was a stress put upon SSOs immediately after the implementation of IRCA to expand service provision to cover the newly enlarged potential client base created by the legislation using the same budgetary constraints used to serve the smaller prior population of clients. As a result, clients saw a reduction in average monthly benefits, as SSOs worked to stretch their dollars thinner to provide services to the larger population:

![Average Monthly AFDC/TANF Benefit per Recipient in Constant 2006 Dollars](image)

(Course, Hauan & Rogers, 2008)

This trend of decreasing average monthly benefits continues, however, despite the increase in SSO funding in the post-Reagan presidency. This is, perhaps, a classic case of too little too late; as the budgets of SSOs were inflated, many LPRs naturalized and became eligible for welfare
programs such as social security, which demand a work tenure before benefits can be collected. Coupled with the passage of the Welfare Reform Act in 1996, recipients of benefits continue to see a decreasing trend in monthly benefits.

In order to offset the stressors associated with service provision to such an expanded group, states could, on an individual basis, apply for State Legalization Impact Assistance Grants. These grants were designed “as a four year mechanism to reimburse ‘the costs incurred by state and local governments in providing public assistance,’ public health assistance, and educational services to eligible legalized aliens” (Ryan, 1992, p. 35). However, these grants did little to offset the impact begotten by most national welfare initiatives (as demonstrated by the HHS graph referenced above) and had the added malevolent effect of rendering the states beholden to the federal SLIAG money, which was available for only a short window of time. It can be asserted that it was necessary for SSOs to alter their task design in the provision of services based upon the availability of resources with reference to the amount of demand for service and upon the channels through which that funding was provided.

- Changes to operational norms within SSOs: It stands that provision of services to undocumented immigrants is a fundamentally different operation process within a SSO than the provision of services to legal permanent residents or naturalized citizens. If a large population (in this case all undocumented
workers prior to the IRCA legislation) is utilizing a narrow margin of social services due to their non-legal status, it follows that utilization patterns would change once amnesty was enacted; in reality, newly legalized immigrants expanded their use of social services to include all the new programs available to them. This resulted in a diversification of priorities for SSOs, which, after the implementation of IRCA, had to deal with the population in question seeking a much larger range of services than previously utilized. Specifically, this put a large amount of stress on services provided at governmental units below the state level, who suddenly saw an increased demand for their services (Weintraub, 1984).

The change in the needs of the key stakeholder group of IRCA-legalized immigrants can be modeled on Rainey and Steinbauer's flowchart as a change in the nature of the stakeholder groups' impact upon the SSO. These needs manifest through a demand for differing (though not necessarily more) resources; it is this change in the nature (rather than the amount) of resources that affect the task design of the agency.

- Changes to scope and mission of SSOs: With a significant change in the composition of SSOs’ stakeholder groups often comes a change in the mission of the agency, and the situation of post-IRCA agencies was no exception. Increased exposure to a group within the social service context leads to a drive to not only assist the immediate needs of the group, but also provide for their long-term well being within society. Foremost, social service
agencies, on a reactionary basis, began to expand the scope of their influence to become advocates for the rights of their new clients. In Social Work in 1989, Donald E. Gelfand and Rebeca Bialik-Gilad wrote:

As is often the case, social workers experience firsthand the effects of social policy decisions on their clients. Unless the majority of undocumented aliens returns to their native country, social workers will find themselves attempting to remedy the effects of an immigration policy that prevents the undocumented alien from attaining satisfactory living conditions. (p. 23)

In the IRCA case specifically, given the issues associated with implementation (i.e. wage suppression, difficult standards for amnesty qualification, and rampant employment discrimination against Latinos), we can also apply this philosophy of ‘familiarity breeding compassionate advocacy’ to the case of newly legalized immigrants under the legislation. The mission of the SSO, therefore, is expanded from pure service provision to also include advocacy, even if it is on an individual case-by-case basis.

Additionally, with the influx of immigrants that IRCA provided, the conceptualization of social work has been broadened in the modern context to become more internationally focused. The traditional definition of welfare, and therein of social work, includes a construction of social rights, granted alongside political and civic rights, by a state actor; in this conceptualization,
the nation-state becomes the benefactor and is charged with protecting the well being of its citizenry. Non-citizens, or those who do not comply with established laws for legality of citizenship status are rendered undeserving of the protection of the state, and are therefore denied social rights and welfare. It is utilizing this conceptualization that the nationalistic fraction of natural-born American citizens based their judgment of the immigration system as 'broken' and in need of reform; a system wherein undeserving, non-compliant actors are protected at the (assumed) expense of deserving protectees must not be acting in the best interests of those it was created to serve.

Under new definitions of social welfare, “international social work also came to mean working with communities that originate in another country, that is, with service users who have moved across borders (Healy, 2008). In this sense, social work with refugees and other migrants can be seen as international, because the nature and causes of the needs experienced by these groups originate elsewhere (war, famine, natural disasters and so on)” (Hugman, Moosa-Mitha & Moyo, 2010, pg. 632). This definition does not paint the state as serving only the interests of its citizens, but rather the interests of groups in their totality. Of course, this shift in mindset is incremental, and not applicable to all SSOs equally, or in such blatant fashions; plenty of SSOs cater exclusively to domestic citizens and do good work through that mission. However, many SSOs have expanded their
missions to include the well being of international and migrant communities as a result of the increased global mobility over the prior decades.

**Conclusion**

Rainey and Steinbauer’s model can be utilized effectively to map the effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 on social service organizations, in the short and long terms. By isolating from the model the linkages between stakeholder groups, resources, and task design, and subsequently analyzing the effects of the legislation as changes to the inputs of those parts of the flowchart (i.e. expanded stakeholder groups and altered levels of resource availability), it is possible to determine how the legislation affected the way that social services conceptualized their task design moving forward under IRCA, and implemented new policies in order to remain effective given a new set of circumstances.

As economic lag in Mexico during the first part of the 20th century motivated more immigrants to enter the United States, through both legal and illegal channels, in order to find work and, in some cases, permanent residence, the immigration issue moved to the forefront of public debate. Legislators recognized that a reform of the system was necessary, and the majority of Americans mirrored this opinion. Hence, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 passed through Congress and was ratified by President Ronald Reagan. Also during this time, President Reagan entrusted social service organizations with addressing social policies within
the country, while simultaneously instituting policies, based on conservative political theory, which forced organizations to compete for funding within the market.

IRCA was ratified with the goal of exacting governmental control over the flow of immigrants into the country. IRCA contained three provisions relative to the operations of SSOs: control of illegal immigration through prevention measures and employer sanctions; a program of amnesty through legalization and eventual naturalization for undocumented immigrants; and reformation of the legal immigration process. Reaction to IRCA’s provisions was decidedly mixed between different subgroups with differing vested interests within the country. In actuality, IRCA’s provisions provided for 2.7 million new legal permanent residents, a slight short-term decrease in the flow of immigration, and a decrease in the average wage for documented immigrant workers. It also resulted in a split effect on hiring practices; some employers discriminated against all Latino workers in order to comply with the new law, while others ignored the law completely and continued to hire undocumented labor.

With reference to the Rainey and Steinbauer model for effective government agencies, the addition of 2.7 low-income taxpayers to the system, most with the qualifications for provision of social welfare services, widened the external stakeholder base, and subsequently put a strain on SSOs to provide services. When coupled with no increase in funding resources (as under Reagan), this constituted
an unfunded mandate, and caused SSOs to alter their task design in order to provide for more clients with constant funding. When coupled with increased funding (as after Reagan's term ended), there was little change to task design. The changes in task design can be divided into three categories: changes to provision of service to clients; changes to SSO operational norms; and changes to the scope and mission of SSOs.

This inquiry does not touch upon many issues relevant to the relationship between immigration and social service provision. For example, further inquiry could examine the differences between the effects on federally-funded and non-federally funded SSOs, or delve further into the number of grants given by the Department of Health and Human Services, the total amount of money given, and the types of grants provided before and after IRCA's implementation. Furthermore, predictions could be made about the effects of an amnesty program's implementation in the present day, based upon the effects of IRCA in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Resources


Rytina, N. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services, Office of Policy and


